

May 12, 1965

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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endorsed by a regional development commission.

Since President Johnson has emphasized his belief that there are many more farm people than farm jobs, industry is taking another good look at farm States as possible sites for factories.

The Federal Government has not been helpful to farm areas in its recent efforts to remove branches of Government operation from rural States to urban centers.

(South Dakota has seen examples of this in attempts to move Veterans' Administration facilities from Sioux Falls to the Twin Cities. And in the proposed law that would permit the Secretary of the Treasury to move some functions of the Internal Revenue Service office in Aberdeen to Kansas City.)

Help rather than hindrance is needed in meeting the problems of rural communities. Regional development commissions could perform a worthwhile service.

## FOUR TIMELY BOOKS ON VIETNAM

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in The Nation for May 17, 1965, are reviews of four recent books on U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

The reviews themselves are made by persons with wide knowledge of, and personal involvement in, that area of the world. Bernard B. Fall, professor of government at Howard University, and the author of books and studies on Indochina, has reviewed the book entitled "The New Face of War," written by Malcolm W. Browne, the Associated Press reporter in Vietnam; also the book entitled "Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerrilla War," written by Wilfred G. Burchett; and the book entitled "Vietnam: An Eye-Witness Account," written by Suzanne Labin.

Charles Mohr, now White House correspondent for the New York Times, who resigned as correspondent for Time magazine, due to disagreements over Vietnam coverage, has reviewed the book entitled "The Making of a Quagmire," written by David Halberstam, New York Times foreign correspondent.

The reviews are fair, objective, and well done.

The books themselves should be required reading for those who wish to understand what is going on in Vietnam and what has been going on there.

I ask unanimous consent that these reviews be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the reviews were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## THE MESS: THREE VIEWS

"The New Face of War," by Malcolm W. Browne, preface by Henry Cabot Lodge. The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 284 pages, \$5.

"Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerrilla War," by Wilfred G. Burchett. International Publishers, 253 pages, \$4.95.

"Vietnam: An Eyewitness Account," by Suzanne Labin. Crestwood Books, 100 pages, \$1.50 paper.

(By Bernard B. Fall)

(NOTE.—Bernard B. Fall, professor of government at Howard University, is the author of "Street Without Joy," "The Two Vietnams," and other studies on Indochina.)

The second Indochina war has been discovered by the American public now that American servicemen are being committed in it in ever-increasing numbers, and books on Vietnam are flooding the bookshelves. And

that is a good thing, for it takes the subject away from the columnists and the official press handouts and puts it where the public can examine it at greater leisure. Not that all those books are good—far from it—or even unbiased (they are not); but they leave a more permanent record of certain crucial events which must be examined if one wishes to understand at least a small part of the war which now engulfs the "two Vietnams."

The three books under review represent an interesting "spread" in the field, since they include an American Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, an Australian who does not hide his Communist sympathies, and a Frenchwoman who, on the score of Vietnam, actually stands to the right of the John Birch Society. Of the three, Browne's book will probably be the most interesting and the most disturbing, for he forces the reader to look unblinkingly into what he calls "the new face of war," from burning Buddhist priests to Vietcong suspects being keelhauled to death behind American armored personnel carriers. It would be interesting to know whether Ambassador Lodge, who prefaced the book, was fully aware of the kind of photographs which would illustrate it.

Browne is a journalist, and by now probably the dean of the Saigon press corps. U.S. division (Newsweek's French reporter François Suly no doubt holding the overall record with 15 years in the country). This gives him an authority few can match. He does not editorialize, nor does he write history; his book is functionally divided into such subjects as "Mechanized paddy war," or "Vietcong gadgets" or "Our image." Working for the Associated Press, Browne writes in the quietly understated style of the wire-service reporter, which only makes the facts he cites more impressive. The reader can, unfortunately, fully believe him when he affirms that of the thousands of officials in the Vietnamese administration whom he meets. "I can think of none who does not more or less hold the Vietnamese people in contempt." Or when he tells the story of the Vietnamese army units who collect "taxes" in a village and later have it napalmed out of existence so as to cover up for their malfeasance. Or when he cites an American official in Saigon as saying that the "only solution to all this is to bomb the hell out of both Hanoi and Saigon, and start the whole thing from scratch, working entirely with the peasants." Although Hanoi may well be bombed before much more of the year has passed, and Saigon may well be mortar shelled in return (or vice versa, depending on who is playing retaliation), I am afraid that is is a bit late for "starting from scratch." The whole world is stuck with the Vietnam mess just the way it is and Malcolm Browne honestly admits there are no good solutions, let alone quick and easy ones.

Having said that the book is excellent and should be read by every concerned person, I can only regret that even as sensitive a journalist as Mr. Browne apparently never bothered to pick up a modicum of Vietnam's background, not even for the past two decades: the Hoa-Hao sect was not led by a "Christlike-looking man named Ba-Cut" but by a mad-looking prophet named Huynh Phu So. Ba-Cut merely was one of the Hoa-Hao war lords. Trinh Minh The did not lead the Cae-Dai forces (he was but one of several war lords and most of the time hostile to his own religious leaders); General de Castries at Dienbenphu did not command a "brigade" but a 15,000-man force; and France's flag, in French, is not the "tricolore"—logical as this may sound to American ears—but the tricolore. In his conclusion, Browne expresses the hope that the United States, in this era of revolutionary warfare, "can put Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Giap to work for it, without embracing communism itself." As a Frenchman who has seen some of his own

country's military embracing such theories as a psychological substitute for true political reforms this reviewer hopes that the United States can do better than that.

Burchett's book is literally the opposite story for he has, over the past 10 years, observed the Vietnam scene from the other side of the fence; either from Hanoi or from Inside South Vietnam itself, but on the Vietcong side. To dismiss Burchett's book simply as "Communist propaganda" would be too easy. Of course, it contains Communist propaganda, but it contains a great number of important truths as well. In fact, Burchett's story is a bit like the Russians' more recent publications on space; enough successes allow them to play at least part of the story straight. There is, for example, no doubt that Burchett repeatedly traveled inside "our" Vietnam (as a corpulent white man, the way I remember him from personal acquaintance) without being picked up by "our" Vietnamese, even though he had been photographed together with some of the American prisoners held by the Vietcong—not one of whom has thus far been liberated by initiatives from our side. This is a good indication of how good Vietcong control over the civilian population is.

Some of the descriptions of life in the "liberated zones" have an evident ring of truth and are fully corroborated by what line-crossers or deserters tell us, and perhaps one of the most tragic-comical lines of the book occurs when the author describes the passage of a column of Communist regulars with rucksacks fashioned from American-donated flour bags, each marked with the U.S. Seal and the inscription: "Gift of the People of the U.S.A." And he adds that the American "clasped hands of friendship" symbol was more in evidence in the Vietcong zone "than their own yellow-starred red and blue flag." (There is, however, a good reason for the discretion about the latter: it draws the unwelcome attention of Vietnamese and American jet bombers.)

The best part of the book, and thus far unequaled in any other publication, is Burchett's description of the organization and structure of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLFSV). After reading it, it is difficult to dismiss the guerrillas as "gooks anonymous." They are men with known backgrounds, with photogenic faces, and with precise political aspirations. Of course, they are "connected" with Hanoi, as were all the West European underground movements affiliated with Special Operations Executive in London during World War II; this did not mean that their political objectives were similar to those of their exile regimes in London even when they received military orders, parachuted equipment, and OSS teams from the outside. In the long run, the "internal" resistance movements largely imposed their stamp on the post-war European liberation regimes. One may well wonder (and Burchett, of course, does not offer a satisfactory answer to this) whether the very harshness of the war is not doing the same thing for the Vietcong.

In his final chapter, Burchett makes the often overlooked point that the NLFSV in 1962 threatened to appeal to North Vietnam for help; and in an epilog, dated January 1965, he quotes Nguyen Huu Tho, the chairman of the Liberation Front, on Gen. Maxwell Taylor's tactics. I wonder whether Taylor ever read it, for it is a frightening symptom of the whole Vietnam mess that Tho and Taylor to all appearances, fully agree:

"He has brought nothing new [from Washington]. A few hundred more U.S. advisers, a few more planes, tanks, artillery. But it is not bombs and artillery that win wars; it is infantry that can occupy territory. And here they are in a real impasse \* \* \*. Above all, it is morale that

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counts; it is the human factor that is decisive."

Apparently, both Taylor and Washington have bought Nguyen Huu Tho's estimate, and now preparations are underway to beef up the Vietnamese Army and to transform the U.S. advisers into an enlarged battle force. And bombing North Vietnam is expected to provide the closest approximation to better morale for the South Vietnamese—and it may just work. It is going to be a long war, the way Burchett and Tho see it. And perhaps that is the way General Taylor sees it, too.

Mme. Labin's book differs from Burchett's in that Burchett, over the years, has become more sophisticated and thinks that the soft sell is on the whole more successful than the ultrahard sell. Not so Mme. Labin. Her book has, on the average, at least two fully capitalized lines per page, complete with exclamation points, not to speak of italic and such subdued titles as "The American Incitement" or "The Wall of Blood." Her line is simple: the weak-kneed, Communist-loving United States sold out the Ngo Dinh Diem regime because it was "winning the war" against the Communists. And she has no hesitation about naming her chief target: "the junto [sic] in the State Department" whose "grim game . . ." was fully disclosed to me by the late Counselor [Ngo Dinh] Nhu and President Diem . . ." Since there is no doubt that this line will become the piece de resistance of a future investigation into what went wrong in Vietnam, it would be well if it could be laid to rest quietly. There may be much wrong with the way the State Department handled Vietnam over the years, but lack of anticomunism was not a part of it.

The rest of Mme. Labin's arguments are mostly based on a lack of information about Vietnamese affairs, which she shares with many people of her persuasion, whether French or American. To prove that the Buddhists are unimportant, she adduces some pretty fantastic statistics, in which she dismisses the Hao-Hao and Cao-Dai Buddhists as non-Buddhists and estimates the tiny (perhaps 15,000) Vietnamese Protestant community at half a million. And to prove that the Diem regime was above financial reproach, she states that a "1958 investigation by a U.S. Senate committee cleared him of asserted misuse of American aid." The joke is that, strictly speaking, she is almost right. The "investigation" took place in July 1959, and did indeed invoke charges of corruption in Vietnam. The aid agency, then known as ICA, submitted to the bemused committee an audit that, if submitted to the Internal Revenue, would surely have landed its author in a Federal penitentiary. The report blandly stated that 147 million plasters had been destroyed by fire as per affidavit of a Vietnamese bailiff, while another 82 million had been allegedly burnt by fire without proper affidavit. Accounts for another 33 million were still not available 3 years later. That amounts to the tidy equivalent of about \$9 million—all of which disappeared at a crucial moment when several Vietnamese generals threw their support to Diem in another little civil war.

Mme. Labin blandly denies that tortures ever took place in Vietnam (no doubt those color spreads in Life were all staged by USIA to improve the American image abroad) and finally compares the wily Ngo Dinh Nhu (who incidentally, in 1958 ran a highly left-wing and neutralist labor movement in Saigon, and during the last days of his life, according to his own wife, Mme. Nhu, had contacts with the Liberation Front) with Thomas Jefferson. But in the final paragraph of her treatise, my compatriot finally relents and admits that some reforms were, after all, needed—in official Washington.

## THE WAR ONLY LASTS A LIFETIME

"The Making of a Quagmire," by David Halberstam, Random House, 323 pages, \$5.95.

(By Charles Mohr)

(NOTE.—Charles Mohr is the White House correspondent for the New York Times. He resigned as Hong Kong bureau chief for Time in 1963 due to disagreements over Vietnam coverage.)

In late 1962 and throughout 1963, the decisive drama of Vietnam was tragically played out. The Vietcong guerrillas, who might at that time have been defeated or contained militarily were allowed to breathe and prosper. They captured many thousands of weapons and grew into the formidable military force they are today. The population, which might have been persuaded to oppose the conquest of the countryside by the Vietcong, was driven into the arms of the guerrillas by policies which failed to protect them or to inspire their loyalty. The American establishment in Saigon, which just might have prevented these irretrievable calamities, failed even to recognize that they were taking place.

Into this doomed and acrimonious atmosphere stepped a few young, relatively inexperienced American reporters. They were the only element in the country, other than the Vietcong, which President Ngo Dinh Diem and his family could not control or intimidate. At times it seemed they were the only Americans on either side of the Pacific whom Robert S. McNamara and other American officials could neither silence nor delude. They distinguished themselves as journalists and men—partly by having the innocence to see what was under their noses, but mainly by having the honor, the guts, and the simple honesty to write the truth in the face of abuse and near slander directed at them from their own Government, and by other American journalists who did not bother to cover the war, much less understand it.

In "The Making of a Quagmire," David Halberstam retells the story of that period. It is a sensitive and brilliant book but, above all, it is an enormously sad one. Like most Americans who have ever spent much time there, Halberstam loved Vietnam and the Vietnamese. The idea of its conquest by the Communists was repugnant to him. His book is a chronicle of lost chances and of official self-delusion.

When Halberstam first arrived in Vietnam in September of 1962, it was possible to be optimistic—but not for long. Frederick G. Noiting, the U.S. Ambassador, once said in exasperation, "You are always looking for the hole in the doughnut, Mr. Halberstam." The holes in American policy were not hard to find. The Ngo Dinh family wanted American arms and money, but did not want American advice. Politically, the government had alienated a large part of the population and administration was a nightmare of confused incompetence. Militarily, the army was being led disastrously by generals appointed not for merit but for political loyalty to the Ngo Dinh family. The American officials could not correct—or even acknowledge—these defects because in the words of another great foreign correspondent, Homer Bigart, they had chosen to "sink or swim with Ngo Dinh Diem."

"Having failed to get reforms," writes Halberstam, "our officials said that these reforms were taking place; having failed to improve the demoralized state of the Vietnamese Army, the Americans talked about a new enthusiasm in the army, having failed to change the tactics of the military, they talked about bold new tactics which were allegedly driving the Communists back. The essence of our policy was: There is no place else to go."

Halberstam and the other reporters discovered this in the simplest way possible.

They became the trusted friends of brilliant young American military officers assigned to advise Vietnamese combat units who turned in frustration to the reporters when their own reports on the downward spiral of the war were ignored, blocked or bottled up in Saigon. They also learned by going into the field to watch the pillow-punching military operations which consistently let the Vietcong escape destruction and by witnessing the cruelly corrosive effect of the war on the Vietnamese population. With growing cynicism and disgust they watched the antics of men like Huynh Van Cao, the worst general in the Vietnamese Army, whom Diem had given the most vital assignments in the Mekong Delta area. Cao's major talent was flattering visiting American brass. Halberstam recalls how, when U.S. Marine Commandant Gen. David Shoup arrived to visit Cao's headquarters, "he was greeted by the 7th Division band playing the 'Marine Hymn,' and by a huge sign reading: 'The U.S. Marine Corps: From the Halls of Montezuma to the Banks of the Mekong River.' Shoup was duly impressed." Cao's forte was not fighting. It was an open secret that Diem had told him to stop taking American advice and to avoid casualties. In 14 division operations from October until December 22, 1962, when he was promoted by the President, Cao's troops suffered only four men killed. At the same time the paramilitary units manning overextended static defense posts were being overrun every night and losing American weapons to the guerrillas.

From the American officers Halberstam learned of some other major problems. The Government forces would not fight at night and they would not patrol. A U.S. captain told Halberstam cynically one day. "They go out at night, walk down the path, take a leak, and then call it a night patrol."

"Although none of us fully realized it then, this was the decisive time in the delta," writes Halberstam.

"A guerrilla war is seen first-hand by the local population; for this reason, not only must a successful force in such a war prove that it has political benefits to offer the peasantry, but it must also prove that it can protect them. In such a military and political situation there is sometimes a crucial moment of truth, which is often unperceived by fairly knowledgeable observers: the moment when the local population senses which side is winning. . . . One side has the momentum and the other doesn't—it is just that simple—and the first people to be aware of this momentum are the peasants."

It is instructive to recall what the top officials were saying at that time. In April 1963, McNamara authorized his press spokesman, Arthur Sylvester, to proclaim, "We have turned the corner in Vietnam." In that same month Gen. Paul D. Harkins, the U.S. commander in Vietnam, predicted in all seriousness that the war would be won "within a year." By the summer and fall of 1963, a full-scale attempt was underway to discredit the reporting of Halberstam and his colleagues. This campaign was joined by Time magazine and by Miss Marguerite Higgins, then of the New York Herald Tribune. Halberstam un gallantly quotes from one of the stories which Miss Higgins wrote at the time, stories which said the war was going remarkably well:

"As of the moment, General Harkins and his staff flatly contradict published reports that South Vietnam's U.S.-backed fight against the Communists—particularly in the rice-rich delta—is deteriorating and that a Vietcong buildup is taking place to the point where the Communists will be able to conduct mobile warfare with battalions as well equipped as the Government's. 'What is mobility?' interjected one of the general's

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corps advisers. 'Mobility means vehicles and aircraft. You have seen the way our Vietnamese units are armed—50 radios, 30 or 40 vehicles, rockets and mortars and airplanes. The Vietcong have no vehicles and no airplanes. How can they be mobile?'

The brainless lack of simple respect for a formidable enemy led to painful results. The Vietcong were fighting in battalion size units even when Miss Higgins wrote: they are fighting in regiment size units today.

Halberstam's plodding, painfully honest work in the field gave him a different view of the enemy. His descriptions of military operations have the sharp quality of snapshots—this is, indeed, the way it was. "Moving in a rice paddy," writes Halberstam, "is a bit like trying to run in one of your own dreams—slowly, your feet stuck, feeling exposed and all alone." He notes that for many years the Vietcong "had fought constantly against an enemy which had superior equipment and air power. By necessity they had learned to be careful and shrewd, and how best to exploit their limited resources. In order to survive they had to be wily; to be careless, sloppy, or indifferent meant sure death. They could never rely on an air strike or armored personnel carriers to bail them out of trouble; rather, there would be air strikes to wipe them out and APC's to crush them. They had to be elusive. Their commanders,' an American captain once told me, 'have a sixth sense about their flanks. It is almost impossible to surround them.'"

Those who read this book will find that the author of this review is mentioned often. Normally I could not review a book by a man with whom I was so closely associated, but if I can be accused of being a prejudiced witness, it must be admitted that I was a witness. And there were precious few of those. One of the great stories of the postwar era was left to a handful of men to cover. And only that handful can give testimony as to how wise and true this book is.

The war in Vietnam will not be won by air strikes on North Vietnam, and certainly not by optimistic press conferences. It will last as long as the incredibly patient, uncomplaining Vietnamese can endure it, and no one saw this more clearly than Halberstam. On his first combat mission moving with a battalion of troops into a delta village he wrote:

"About a hundred yards away we came upon a dead peasant lying in the yard of his hut with a poncho spread over him. Two huts further on, a desperately frightened old man of 80 years was genuflecting in front of the American and Vietnamese officers and telling them he had never heard of the Vietcong. How many times had this old man had to tell Government troops that he knew no Vietcong? How many times had he had to tell the Vietcong that he knew no Government troops? 'The war,' a young Vietnamese said to me bitterly later, 'only lasts a lifetime.'

## MEANINGFUL STATISTICS ON THE FARM SITUATION

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, few segments of American life are more completely analyzed and reported by the statisticians than is our agriculture. The Department of Agriculture issues scores of regular statistical reports on crops, marketings, acreages, production, livestock numbers, prices, costs—every detail of farming.

The statistics are so voluminous that sometimes we fall into disagreement about their meaning and the interpretations which should be put on them.

I have just received from the Lemmon, S. Dak., Chamber of Commerce a copy of some agricultural statistics and an interpretation of their meaning that can readily be understood. They are contained in a statement sent to our agriculture committees; and they are so clear and understandable that I wish to share them with readers of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD and with the press.

The Lemmon Chamber of Commerce statement shows that in 1963, there were 42 farm-auction sales in the trade area of this town of 2,500 population; and in 1964, there were 51 selling-out auctions.

The elimination from agriculture of this many farmers and their families is estimated to result in a \$911,547 loss in trade volume. This estimate might be disputed; but there is no disputing the next statistic offered—the closure of 11 business establishments, including hardware stores, implement dealerships, groceries, and a furniture store.

These figures present as clear a picture of the situation in the farm country in America as can be found in volumes of statistics from the Department of Agriculture—indisputable proof of the contention of the Lemmon Chamber of Commerce that "the present inequitable farm parity program is crushing the economy of the rural area. It is disastrous not only to the farmer-rancher but also to the towns, cities, countries, States, and individuals."

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the Lemmon Chamber of Commerce statement and the text of a typical farm-auction sale bill which was enclosed with the statement.

There being no objection, the statement and the bill were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A STATEMENT TO THE AGRICULTURAL COMMITTEES OF THE U.S. CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, D.C.

(By the Lemmon Chamber of Commerce, Lemmon, S. Dak.)

Honorable Chairman and gentlemen, you, the gentlemen of the U.S. Congress, have been informed of the difficulties of the farmer-rancher and at this time especially of those in the northern Plains States.

We, the Lemmon Chamber of Commerce, wish to present to you some thoughts of the disastrous side effects of the farmer-rancher problem. The elimination of people from the land; the elimination of business dependent on and of assistance to the farmer-rancher; and the potential financial straits of all people in the rural Northern Plains agricultural area.

The low parity of farm product prices and subsequently low income of the farmer-rancher compared to the increasing costs of operation has compelled the average farmer-rancher to either expand his operation or dispose of his properties on which he is unable to earn a living income. This is shown through auction sales of farm equipment and personal belongings and the farmer-rancher moving to some other place to attempt to make a living with the result we have fewer and larger farms and less people.

As an example, farm auction sales in the Lemmon, S. Dak., trade area in 1963 and 1964 were as follows: Penfield Auction Service held 42 farm auction sales in 1963 and 34 farm auction sales in 1964. Francis Haley held 17 farm auction sales in 1964.

This total of 93 farm auction sales equaled

93 less farm families in the area. The average size of the farms and ranches was increased but the area population was decreased. A farm auction sales bill of such a sale is attached to show what is generally disposed of—a lifetime of savings at a forced liquidation price of a few cents on the dollar valuation.

The dire effect of this outmigration of farm families is shown in a survey conducted whereby the first 10 farm accounts of an accountant's file were checked as to the expenditures for farm-ranch operations expenses. These expenses totaled \$100,170, or an average of \$10,017, spent by each farmer-rancher.

On this average basis it is shown that the loss to business from the 91 liquidated farms-ranches and eliminated farm family expenditures in this area total \$911,547. This, plus the unrecorded personal expenditures would be far in excess of a million dollars annually, a loss to the small business of the area which has had a dire effect on the towns of the area of this western North and South Dakota area.

During the past 2 years many business firms have been liquidated and we note these so that you will recognize that many types of services and assistance are removed. These not only affect the local community but show the lessening distribution to these points by industries of other portions of the United States.

These liquidations by auctions and other means are: Gambles Hardware Store; Fin-sand's Hardware; Davison's Case Farm Implements; Red Owl Grocery; City Market Grocery, all of Lemmon, S. Dak.; Era Hardware & Implements, Watauga, S. Dak.; Oberlander Farm Implements; Sack Service Hardware; Reeder Furniture, all of Reeder, N. Dak.; Cooperative Grocery, Scranton, N. Dak.; Carstens-Zempel Hardware, Bowman, N. Dak.

These 11 firms are no longer an economic factor in these communities and have lessened the capabilities of main street to be of assistance to the farmer-rancher in his production and to assist him in combating the inequities that the present below-parity farm program places on the area farmer-rancher.

Lemmon, S. Dak., although a city of only 2,500 people, is proud of being a financial center for the area farmer-ranchers. Its banks are highly rated in that only banks in the 11 major cities of South Dakota have greater deposits. These deposits as of January 1, 1965, in Lemmon's two banks totaled \$13,547,275; but, sorry to say, that is only part of the story. If the people of the area had this money unencumbered it would show a prosperous rural economy. What must also be shown are the debts of the area and in this instance, the above-noted banks, with the Northwest South Dakota Production Credit Association and the Federal Land Bank Association of Lemmon, S. Dak., show, as of January 1, 1965, loans totaling \$18,119,000. Too, this does not show loans made by Federal agencies. A financial situation fraught with danger for the individual farmer-rancher.

In summary: The present inequitable farm parity program, with constantly forced reduction in cash income crops acreage, is crushing the economy of the rural area of these Dakotas. It is not only disastrous to the farmer-rancher but to the towns, cities, counties, States, and individuals.

We, the Lemmon Chamber of Commerce, request that you, the Congress of the United States, give heed to this situation and evolve a program of farm product price parity in income that will tend to correct the present situation of lessening income and higher costs of farm-ranch product production.

ARTHUR SVENDEBY,  
Manager, Lemmon Chamber of Commerce.  
LEMMON, S. DAK., May 1, 1965.

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## FARM AUCTION

Having decided to quit farming and leave the State we are selling at auction our personal property and livestock at the place 2 miles north and 1 mile west of White Butte, Friday, November 8. Sale time 10 o'clock. Lunch served by Ladies Club.

## LIVESTOCK

Eight milk cows, one just fresh and one to freshen soon.

Seven calves.

Eight yearling Hereford heifers.

One registered Hereford bull, 6 years old.

Ten registered Hereford cows.

Eight Hereford cows, not registered.

Fifty-five 1-year-old laying hens.

## HOUSEHOLD GOODS

One bottle gas apartment-size stove.

One Maytag washing machine.

One No. 618 DeLaval electric cream separator.

One bottle gas heater, four-room size.

One bottle gas tank, 250 gallon.

One large cabinet heater.

Three steel cabinets.

Two wardrobes.

Two base cabinets.

One bed with spring.

One day bed.

One dining table and chairs.

One chest of drawers.

## TOOLS

One garden seeder.

One garden rake.

Two garden hoes.

One garden cultivator.

Two log chains.

Three oil barrels, 30-gallon.

Four grease guns, oil and grease.

Two scoop shovels.

Two forks.

One new hay knife.

One lariat rope.

## FARM MACHINERY

One 1957 12-foot S.P. Allis Chalmers combine with pickup.

One 1957 Allis Chalmers forage harvester.

One 1956 Massey Harris side delivery rake.

One 1955 John Deere dump rake.

One 1954 John Deere power mower, 7 foot.

Two 10-foot John Deere discs.

One 9-foot John Deere one way.

One 14-inch John Deere three-bottom plow.

One 1952 16-inch four-bottom plow.

One 1952 WD-9 International tractor.

One 1942 H International tractor.

One 1956 Ford 1-ton truck.

One 1952 11-foot International drill.

One Farmhand with haybasket and grapple fork.

One hayrack with trailer.

One hayrack, with steel wagon.

One 10-inch International feed grinder.

Two gas engines—one 5 horsepower and one 1½ horsepower.

One grain elevator.

One sickle grinder.

One vise and stand.

One post drill.

Four gas barrels.

One 300-gallon gas tank with hose.

One 240-gallon gas tank with hose.

One barrel pump.

One tank heater.

Four 1-inch well pipes.

Three hog troughs.

One feed bunk.

One Clipper fanning mill.

One grindstone.

One pump jack.

Two sets good harness, one set nearly new.

One stack silage, about 100 tons.

About 150 tons of hay.

Scrap iron.

Other articles too numerous to mention.

Terms: Cash.

No property to be removed till settled for, or see clerk before sale.

Steve Braun, owner. Bob and Earl Penfield, auctioneers; license Nos. 117 and 166. Bank of Lemmon, clerk.

prompt approval, and the people of the State ratified the proposal.

Now it is possible to explore hitherto nearly inaccessible areas of Alaska.

Author Garrett left his mobile home in Juneau, and flew by helicopter 25 miles east, "landing near the middle of the 12,000-square-mile Juneau icefield," where Dr. Maynard M. Miller is working—under a National Geographic Society research grant—to complete a classic study of Alaska ice. Author Garrett has illustrated his visit with spectacular ice photographs.

His article is generously supplied with superb Alaskan views.

I shall not attempt to describe further the jeweled descriptions of Alaskan treasures which are to be found in Mr. Garrett's work. He has combined word and picture; and the National Geographic has used its magnificent resources to recapture the beautiful scenery of Alaska, which Mr. Garrett has photographed in color. In his concluding paragraph, Mr. Garrett compactly describes the real value of the marine highway which connects Alaska's far-flung empire:

Now the marine highway has opened a new trail to the north. By 1966, Canada will have added a ferry link between Vancouver Island and the Alaska ferry system terminus at Prince Rupert. With already existing service from the State of Washington to the city of Victoria, on Vancouver Island, this will complete the ferry route through the Inside Passage, a new lifeline from parent Nation to youthful State, speeding its great and imminent growth.

I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the article entitled "Alaska's Marine Highway," published in the June 1965 issue of the National Geographic magazine, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## ALASKA'S MARINE HIGHWAY—FERRY ROUTE TO THE NORTH

(By W. E. Garrett)

For decades, gold from the Klondike and Alaska diggings flowed down the inside passage to the United States—the "Outside" or the "South 48," as Alaskans say. Then, no longer profitable, the gold workings closed.

Now the 49th State has moved to reverse the flow of wealth with a fleet of fast, far-ranging ferries to entice tourists and trade and make the inside passage a marine thoroughway to the north. Three new vessels, each bearing the name of an Alaskan glacier, have opened seven towns and 1,500 miles of coastline to cars and trucks. In their first 2 years of service, the ferries have carried 187,000 Alaskans and outsiders.

Not since the gold rush of 1898 has southeastern Alaska seen so many strangers. But today they come with their cars and their truck-campers, in search not of the pot of gold, but of the rainbow itself—the scenic beauty of Alaska.

For residents of the Alaska coastline, many of them cut off from the rest of their State and the world by water, ice, and lack of roads or rails, the new year-round ferries—added to long-established service by tour ships, freighters, and planes—have brought a virtual end to isolation. The *Malaspina*, *Taku* and *Matanuska* each transport 108 cars and 500 passengers at 17 knots. Since 1963 they have run regularly through Alaska's Florida